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1. Introduction 
The Split Share Structure Reform of China (e.g. Firth, Lin, and Zou, 2010; Li, Wang , 
Cheung and Jiang, 2011) that started in 2005 marks a major change in the institutional setting 
of the Chinese stock market. Prior to this reform, state shareholders mainly held restricted 
shares that cannot be freely traded in the stock market as the shares held by private 
shareholders. This creates a conflict of interest between state and private shareholders since 
share price movement in the capital market does not affect the wealth of the former group. As 
a result, the widespread concentration of state ownership in Chinese listed firms (e.g. Allen, 
Qian, and Qian, 2005) induce less incentive alignment effect and more entrenchment effect, 
which in turn reduces corporate governance and transparency (e.g. Gul, Kim, and Qiu, 2010). 
The reform abolishes this split share structure and causes state shareholders’ wealth to become 
sensitive to share price movement. This should align the incentive of state and private 
shareholders to monitor and ensure managers maximize the market value of their firms.  
In this study, we examine whether this reform improves the corporate transparency of 
Chinese listed firms through their share price informativeness. This is an important question 
because corporate transparency facilitates the efficient allocation of financial resource in 
capital market, which is essential to economic development and growth. For the growing 
interest among academics, policy makers, and practitioners on the economic development of 
China, we provide empirical evidence to verify the impact of this major reform on the 
information environment of the Chinese capital market. For the corporate governance 
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literature, which largely focuses on developed countries (e.g. Denis and McConnell, 2003), we 
provide empirical evidence from an emerging country with a unique research setting of 
exogenously reduced conflict of interest between shareholders.  
The influence of governance mechanism on corporate transparency is well 
established in the literature (see Section 2.2 for a review). The separation of ownership and 
control leads to information asymmetry between corporate insiders and external stakeholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers and controlling owners with greater opportunities to 
expropriate wealth from outside investors have greater incentives to conceal their self-serving 
deeds by withholding information or window dressing performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Such opportunistic behaviors should reduce when corporate governance becomes more 
effective. This should also increase the information content and credibility of firms’ disclosure, 
which renders share price more informative of firm-specific information. Thus, increased 
share price informativeness among Chinese listed firms following the Split Share Structure 
Reform could reflect corporate governance improvement.  
This corporate governance effect is generated mainly through the incentive alignment 
between controlling and minority shareholders and not necessarily through changes in 
ownership structure or control. Such alignment occurs despite of the reform’s gradual 
implementation process (see Section 2.3 for details) and applies to state shareholders who are 
not immediately selling their shares. The concern that this incentive alignment cannot be 
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realized if state shareholders believe that the tradability of their shares are only symbolic 
because the Chinese government does not relinquish its control on any listed firms is mitigated 
in two ways. First, well-established government policy seeks to maintain state influence only 
on strategically important sectors. Second, media anecdotal evidences confirm that some state 
shareholders are actively trading their shares after the restrictions are lifted.  
Given the aforementioned arguments, we hypothesize that the Split Share Structure 
Reform should increase the share price informativeness of Chinese listed firms, especially 
those with higher proportion of state or restricted shares since the impact of this reform is 
expected to be more pronounced among such firms. To test our assertion, we sample all 
Chinese firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the sample period of 
2001 to 2008.
1
 Among firms with higher state or restricted shares, we observe lower share 
price informativeness prior to the reform and greater increase in share price informativeness 
following the reform. These results are robust to control of firm characteristic and governance 
variables, as well as industry and regional effect. Our result is also not sensitive to share price 
informativeness estimated through alternative model specifications and data frequencies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and methodologies. Section 4 presents our 
empirical findings. Section 5 shows the robustness check. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature and hypotheses 
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2.1 Ownership structure and corporate governance 
Ownership structure affects this corporate governance through two opposing effects, 
i.e. incentive alignment versus entrenchment. The incentive alignment effect occurs when the 
profit or firm value maximization objective of minority shareholders is consistent with that of 
large shareholders, who in turn also has more expertise and capability to monitor managers 
(e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Empirical evidence confirms this by showing that firms with 
large shareholders are associated with higher management turnover (Kang and Shivdasani, 
1995) and tighter executive compensation control (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Gomes (2000) 
also suggests that a high degree of ownership concentration also serves as a signal for 
reputation-building by controlling owners. In this context, large shareholders have more to 
lose from a decline in their firm’s value than they could gain from diverting their firm’s cash 
flow into their pocket. 
The entrenchment effect of large shareholders is conceptually similar to that when 
managerial ownership is high. Theoretical (e.g. Stulz, 1988) and empirical (e.g. McConnell 
and Servaes, 1990) studies suggest that managers with greater ownership also have more 
incentives to expropriate the wealth of outside shareholder, which in turn reduces the value of 
the firm. Shleifer et al. (1997) argue that large shareholders who gain effective control of a 
firm’s management also have greater incentives to pursue their own interest, which is not 
necessarily the interest of other investors. Johnson, La Porta, Lopez de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
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(2000) confirm that controlling shareholders transfer assets and profits out of the firm for their 
own benefit and call this “tunneling”. Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) show that 
firm values drop when the control rights of large shareholders exceed their cash-flow rights. 
2.2 Corporate governance and transparency 
Empirical studies confirm the role of corporate governance in determining corporate 
transparency.
2
 Beasley (1996) shows firms with more independent board, greater outside 
director ownership, and longer outside director tenure are associated with less financial 
statement fraud. Dechow, Sloan, and Hutton (1996) show that firms manipulating earnings are 
more likely to be those with less independent board or CEO duality. Klein (2002) documents a 
negative relationship between abnormal accruals and the independence of audit committee or 
board. Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005) find that firms with more outside directors and 
greater institutional ownership are more likely to issue management earnings forecasts that are 
more accurate and less optimistically biased. Armstrong, Balakrishnan, and Cohen (2010) find 
that information asymmetry decreased and financial statement informativeness increased 
following passage of antitakeover laws.  
The positive relationship between governance and corporate transparency is also 
largely confirmed in China. For instance, Yuan, Zhang, and Zhang (2007) provide evidence of 
greater earnings management among Chinese state-controlled listed firms. They interpret this 
as an evidence of greater entrenchment effect over incentive alignment effect from large 
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shareholders of state-controlled firms. Wang, Wong, and Xia (2008) find Chinese 
state-controlled listed firms are more likely to hire small audit firms within the same region. 
They argue that collusion incentive between firms and auditors to cover-up earnings 
manipulation could be a possible explanation for this pattern. Gul et al. (2010) document less 
share price informativeness among Chinese firms with higher degree of ownership 
concentration. They also show that foreign ownership and auditor quality are inversely related 
with share price informativeness. 
2.3 Split Share Structure Reform in China 
Since 1978, China began to make major reforms to its economy, moving from a 
centrally planned to a market oriented economy. After the stock market was established in the 
early 1990s, it imposed a split share structure that divides the shares of listed firms into 
restricted and tradable ones. Restricted shares are classified into state and legal person shares, 
which are largely held by central or local government affiliated shareholders through either 
government bureaucratic agencies or state owned enterprises (SOEs).
3 
They can only be 
transferred under authorities’ approval at a price close to book value of the firm or auctioned at 
a heavily discounted value (e.g. Chen, Firth, Xin and Xu, 2008; Huang and Xu, 2009; Hou and 
Howell, 2011) relative to freely tradable counterparts of the same firm. In either case, these 
shares are still untradeable after changing hands.  
To further reform the capital market, the Chinese government is keen to abolish this 
approach. On 29
th
 April 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
8 
 
announced its policy intention to implement the conversion of restricted shares into 
freely-traded shares, which will be carried out gradually through selected batches of firms 
until it is enacted across all listed firms in China. Two initial batches of firms were first 
selected on 9
th
 May and 19
th
 June 2005 for piloting. On 4th September 2005, the official 
documents
 
named Administration Measures for the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed 
Firms providing implementation procedures were officially released, giving clear and detailed 
instructions to the inception of the full market-wide reform from 12
th
 September 2005 onward. 
When a firm is selected to carry out the reform, it begins a gradual process that starts 
with the negotiation of a compensation payout plan with existing freely tradable shareholders 
(e.g. Firth et al. 2010; Li et al. 2011). Restricted shares paid out as part of the compensation to 
existing freely tradable shareholders becomes immediately tradable. Over the next 36 months, 
the proportion of restricted shares becomes increasing tradable. All restricted shares become 
fully tradable in the stock market 36 months after the ratification of the compensation payout 
plan. By the end of 2008 most Chinese listed firms have completed their compensation payout 
plan ratifications and began enacting the gradual release of their restricted shares, and these 
firms will no longer have restricted shares around the end of 2011. 
2.4 Hypotheses development 
Prior to the Split Share Structure Reform of 2005, this state ownership is maintained 
through restricted shares. This insulates state shareholders of the wealth implications of the 
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stock return performance of their firms. As a result, state shareholders are more interested in 
pursuing political credits acquired when their firm carries out government initiatives or by 
cash dividends payouts should the firm achieve certain operating performance targets. 
However, the government initiatives may not necessarily be in the interest of minority 
shareholders and operating performance could be achieved through earnings management. 
Thus, the split share structure tilts the effect of state ownership concentration on Chinese listed 
firms away from incentive alignment and toward entrenchment, which causes adverse effect to 
the governance of Chinese listed firms. For instance, empirical studies show that executive 
pay in state-controlled firms is not sensitive to share returns (Firth et al. 2006) and that 
restricted shareholders prefers cash over stock dividends (Wei and Xiao, 2009). 
The Split Share Structure Reform induces an exogenous alignment of incentives 
between state and private shareholders of Chinese listed firms. It renders the wealth of state 
shareholders sensitive to share return performance in the capital market as their private 
shareholder counterparts. This reduction the existing conflict of interest between the two 
shareholders groups is expected to strengthen their joint effort to ensure managers maximize 
the market value of the firm. To achieve this, they must strengthen corporate governance and 
reduce opportunity of managers to expropriate wealth from the firm at the expense of outside 
investors. This in turn reduces the incentive and need of managers and controlling owners to 
withhold and/or manipulate price sensitive information. This effect should be more 
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pronounced among firms with higher state ownership or restricted shares. Given these 
aforementioned arguments, we test the following two hypotheses: 
H1: Prior to the Split Share Structure Reform, Chinese listed firms with more state 
ownership or restricted shares have lower share price informativeness. 
H2: Following the Split Share Structure Reform, Chinese listed firms with more state 
ownership or restricted shares are associated with greater increase in share 
price informativeness. 
One possible critique against our hypothesis H2 is that despite of the trading 
restrictions being lifted, state shareholders will still not sell their shares due to government 
pressure not to relinquish state control of listed firms. If this is the case, the reform leads to 
limited incentive alignment effect. However, there are four main counter-arguments to this 
specific critique. First, the Chinese government has an well-established policy known as 
“Zhua Da Fang Xiao” (or literally “grasp big and release small”), which calls for gradual 
focus of its control only on listed firms of strategically vital sectors (e.g. energy, transportation, 
defence, etc) and encourages the relaxation of its involvement in less important businesses.
4
 In 
fact, Chen, Firth, Xin, and Xu (2008) document 62 control transfers of listed firms from state 
shareholders to private ones from 1996 to 2000, which is prior to the reform. Second, there are 
many anecdotal evidence from the media suggesting that previously restricted shares held by 
state shareholders have been actively traded in the stock market following this reform.
5
 Third, 
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even state shareholders who do not sell their shares immediately after trading is allowed can  
have incentives to see the increase of their firms’ market value. Such shareholders could be 
holding on to the shares because they see long-term growth prospect of their firms’ market 
value and are therefore willing to contribute their influence to ensure this expectation can be 
realized. Fourth, the corporate governance benefit of this reform that we predict is directly 
achieved through the alignment of incentives between state and private shareholders and is not 
dependent on the change in ownership structure from state to private shareholders.  
Another potential critique of our hypothesis H2 is that the incentive alignment effect 
does not occur before all restricted shares of a firm become fully tradable, which will be 36 
months after the ratification of the compensation plan in the reform process. Based on this 
argument, it is only possible to study the effect of the reform across all firms in the Chinese 
stock market using a post-2011 sample. However, this argument is based on the narrow 
assumption that all restricted shareholders are myopic and could not plan ahead. The CSRC’s 
policy announcement, piloting, and guideline issuing during 2005 already made clear the 
government’s intention to proliferate the reform subsequently across all Chinese listed firms. It 
would be in the best interest of the restricted shareholders to influence and increase their firms’ 
market value before their restricted shares are eligible for trading so that they can maximise 
their profit whenever they want to do so after the trading becomes allowed. In addition, 
restricted shareholders with less than 5% of the total outstanding shares can trade after 12 
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months horizon, and these with 5% or more can still trade shares equivalent to 5% of the 
outstanding shares between the 12 to 24 month horizon, and 10% between the 24 to 36 month 
horizon (see Cumming and Hou, 2012). Thus, the argument that incentive alignment occurs 
only after this horizon neglects the wealth implication of to the partially released trading 
constraints over this period.  
Finally, one confounding effect that may influence part of post-reform period is the 
mandatory convergence of the Chinese accounting standard toward the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) from 2007 onward. If IFRS indeed strengthens Chinese listed 
firms’ accounting quality, then this may also improve firm-specific disclosure and information 
environment. However, an international study across 51 countries including China by Daske, 
Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2008) reveals that IFRS effect only in countries where firms have 
incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong. Thus, given the consensus 
in the literature that China has weak investor protection and legal enforcement, its mandatory 
IFRS adoption is not expected to have immediate and systematic impact on listed firms (e.g. 
Chen and Cheng, 2007). Indeed, He, Wong, and Young (2009) provide empirical evidence that 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS did not improve the earnings quality of Chinese firms. Their 
result reduces the possibility that the evidence we find in support of our prediction in 
hypothesis H2 is attributed to the IFRS mandatory adoption instead of the Split Share 
Structure Reform. As further robustness check, we also replicate our analyses by excluding the 
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time period in which mandatory IFRS adoption would affect share price of Chinese listed 
firms and find consistent results (see Section 4.2.4). 
3. Methodology and sample 
3.1 Test of Hypotheses 
Existing literature (e.g. Roll, 1988) suggest that the proportion of stock return 
variations not attributed to market-wide information indicates the rate in which private 
information is impounded into the stock prices through trading. Firm-specific return variation 
has been widely adopted in the literature as a proxy of share price informativeness to examine 
corporate transparency.
6
 We carry out the empirical tests of hypotheses H1 and H1, through 
regressions of Equation 1 below: 
ti
titititi
titititititi
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    (1) 
The dependent variable Ψi,t is share price informativeness measure of firm i in year t derived  
either only from the Chinese domestic stock market returns or both the Chinese domestic and 
U.S. stock market returns by following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008). The latter captures 
return variations due to market-wide information in the U.S., where the export of Chinese 
firms have high degree of dependence. To identify firms with greater sensitivity to the reform, 
we define RATIOi,t either as state to total share ratio (STATE) or restricted to total share ratio 
(RESTRICT).
7
 To capture the impact of the reform, we define SSSRi,t  as 1 for years from 
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2006 onward and 0 otherwise. As we discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, the CSRC’s policy 
announcement, piloting, and guideline issuing over 2005 should already sent clear signals to 
the market about the impending reform across all listed firms. Assuming state shareholders are 
forward-looking and not myopic, these market-wide signals should start to invoke the 
incentives alignment effect between them and the private shareholders from 2006 onward even 
among firms that are not immediately selected by CRSC to implement the reform procedure. 
As part of our robustness test, we replicate our analyses by substituting SSSRi,t with another 
variable designated as REFORMi,t, which equals 1 from the year in which firm i is selected to 
begin the reform procedure and 0 otherwise. The SSSRi,t variable captures market-wide effect 
from 2006 onward while REFORMi,t variable captures firm-specific effect from the year a firm 
is chosen to implement the process. We include control variables broadly similar to Gul et al. 
(2010).
8
 SIZEi,t is the market capitalization of the firm. MBi,t is measured as market-to-book 
ratio, LEVi,t is measured as debt-to-total asset ratio. IROAi,t is the industry median adjusted 
return on asset, measured by operating income divided by total asset. VOLi,t is trading volume 
measured as turnover, which is the number of shares traded as a percentage of the total 
tradable shares. We further include corporate governance variables for controls following its 
link with firm transparency as established in Section 2.2. CHOLDi,t is 1 for firms with CEO 
shareholding in yearly cross-sectional top or bottom 25
th
 percentile and 0 otherwise. Low CEO 
ownership reduces incentive alignment with shareholders and high CEO ownership induces 
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entrenchment. Thus, both effects increase agency problems. CDUALi,t is 1 for firms with CEO 
also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. CEOs that also serve as chairman of the board 
have power to reduce the effectiveness of board monitoring against them. BINDPi,t is 1 for 
firms with proportion of independent directors above yearly cross-sectional median and 0 
otherwise. Independent shareholders are assumed to have more incentive and expertise to 
monitor managers. BSIZEi,t is 1 for firms with board size above yearly cross-sectional median 
and 0 otherwise. Finally, Industry and Area are industry and regional effects. We define 
industry according to first two digits of GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) codes. 
We define region based on Firth et al., (2006), which groups firms into four different regions 
based on economic develop level.
9
 For brevity we do not report the coefficients of the 10 
industry dummy variables and 3 regional dummy variables that are estimated from our 
regression analyses in the tables. 
Coefficient α1 indicates the relationship between share price informativeness and 
firms that are assumed to have greater conflict of interest between dominant and minority 
shareholders before the reform. Given the argument that state ownership and restricted shares 
reduce corporate governance, which in turn reduces corporate transparency, we expect α1 < 0. 
This finding would confirm our prediction in the H1 hypothesis and would also be broadly 
similar to the findings of Gul et al. (2010), which shows that firms with more government 
ownership have lower share price informativeness. Coefficient α3 indicates the incremental 
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relationship after the reform between share price informativeness and firms that are assumed 
to be more sensitive to the abolishment of restricted shares. To confirm the prediction of our 
hypothesis H1, we must observe α3 > 0. This will indicate incrementally higher share price 
informativeness following the reform among firms with either higher state ownership or 
proportion of restricted shares, which we argue are more sensitive to the abolishment of the 
split share structure. Consistent inference drawn from combinations of alternative share price 
informativeness measures as well as our control variables will strengthen the robustness of our 
findings. 
By following Fernandes et al. (2008), for each firm i, we estimate stock price 
informativeness for the year t from a time-series regression of the 52 firm-specific weekly excess 
returns on the corresponding weekly excess returns of different market portfolios: 
ti
CN
tti rmr ,10,                (2) 
ti
US
t
CN
tti rmrmr ,210,              (3) 
where tir ,  is the weekly stock return of firm i in week t minus 7-day interbank offered rate in 
China, which is a proxy of the risk-free rate; CNtrm  is the weekly return of Shanghai Composite 
Index minus 7-day interbank rate in China; UStrm is the weekly excess return of US stock markets, 
which is calculated as the value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus 
the one-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates). Equation 2 considers systematic stock 
returns of the Chinese stock market index. Equation 3 follows Fernandes et al. (2008) to further 
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account for systematic stock returns of the US market. Since US is China’s largest trading partner, 
it makes sense to account for this source of stock return variation. Each firm-specific time-series 
regression produces a goodness-of-fit measure (
2
,tiR ). We then compute relative firm-specific 
return variation as the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility, which is precisely 
equivalent to 
2
,1 tiR . Following Fernandes et al. (2008), we conduct our test using a logistic 
transformation of
2
,1 tiR : 







 

2
,
2
,
,
1
log
ti
ti
ti
R
R
                (4) 
Our dependent variable Ψi,t therefore measures firm-specific stock return variation relative to 
marketwide variation. We denote the stock price informativeness measures based on the
2
,tiR
derived from Equations 2 and 3 as Ψ1 and Ψ2 respectively.  
As robustness tests, we also replicate our hypotheses tests based on share price 
informativeness estimated from daily returns using Equation (2) and (3) as well as alternative 
model specifications that accounts for systematic stock return variations of industry indices 
( trind ), MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) World Index (
W
trm ), as well as Chinese 
A ( CNAtrm ), B (
CNB
trm ) and H (
CNH
trm ) share indices as in Gul et al. (2010)
10
:     
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3.2 Sample Description, Summary Statistics, and Correlation Analyses 
The sample period of our analyses spans from 2001 to 2008. From GTA (Guo Tai 
An)/ CSMAR (China Stock Market and Accounting Research) and CCER (China Center of 
Economic Research) we obtain variables including stock returns, proportion of state shares, 
proportion of restricted shares, market capitalization, market-to-book value, debt-to-equity 
ratio, return on asset ratio, trading volume, CEO ownership, CEO duality, number of outside 
directors, board size, as well as industrial and regional classifications. We obtain weekly 
returns of Chinese domestic market from Datastream and the U.S. stock market from CRSP 
(Center for Research in Security Prices). We winsorize the top and bottom 1 percentile of these 
variables to reduce the impact of outliers. We include all listed firms in both Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. We exclude newly listed firms after the reform was launched at the 
end of 2005 since they no longer adopt a split share structure. Our final sample requires all the 
aforementioned variables to have valid values, and has 9,871 firm-year observations. Within 
our sample, the number of firms selected by the CSRC to carry out the reform and have their 
compensation payout plan ratified by shareholders in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 are 224, 894, 
103, and 16 respectively.  
Table 1 Panel A indicates the number of firms per year in our sample, which covers 
the period from 2001 to 2008. Table 1 Panel B presents the summary statistics of these 
variables used in our analyses. The two share price informativeness measures Ψ1 and Ψ2 we 
use in our analysis have median of 1.9523 and 1.7048 respectively over the sample period. 
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Following Fernandes et al. (2008), the value of these measures are logistic transformed 
firm-specific return variation relative to market-wide return variation (see Equation 4). Since 
Ψ1 accounts only for the domestic Chinese market information, it is higher than Ψ2, which 
accounts additionally for the market-wide information in U.S. as well. The median level of 
STATE, which is the proportion of shares held by state affiliated shareholders but excluding 
legal person shares, is 0.3406, which is broadly similar to Gul et al. (2010) despite the 
difference between our sample period and theirs. This indicates that the level influence of the 
state on Chinese listed firms had not changed through time. The median level of restricted 
shares RESTRICT is 0.5662, which is higher than STATE since it also contains legal person 
shares. They have a median market-to-book ratio of 2.5697 and volume of 3.375, which are 
both higher than the earlier sample period used in Gul et al. (2010) and reflects the growth of 
the Chinese economy and stock market trading activity. Table 1 also reports the summary 
statistics of the underlying variable we use to construct our corporate governance control 
variables, i.e. CHOLD, CDUAL, BINDP, and BSIZE. The average CEO ownership is 0.19% 
with over 75% of firms having no executive shareholding (See Conyon and He, 2008). Only 1 
% of firms have CEO serving as chairperson of the board. On the average, independent 
directors account for 47.58% of the board and the average board has 7 directors. 
< Insert Table 1 here > 
For brevity, we do not tabulate and only summarize the main results from the 
bivariate correlation analyses of the variables used in our study. The share price 
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informativeness measures (Ψ1 and Ψ2) are negatively correlated with state ownership (STATE), 
firm size (lnSIZE), and extreme managerial shareholding (CHOLD). Firms with more state 
influence enjoy more financial support from the government and thus have less incentive to 
communicate with outside investors. Larger firms have less firm-specific variations since they 
contribute more to market returns in emerging market such as China (Gul et al. 2010). Firms 
are less likely to be transparent when their managers have less incentive alignment and more 
entrenchment. The share price informativeness measures are positively correlated with growth 
opportunities (MB) and leverage (LEV). Firms with higher growth opportunities or more 
borrowing may volunteer to release more information to attract equity investors.  
4. Empirical findings 
4.1 Main Tests of Hypotheses 
Table 2 presents the multivariate regression analyses using state shares to total shares 
ratio to identify firms more sensitive to the reform. Panels A and B use Ψ1 and Ψ2 respectively 
as dependent variables. In each panel, Regression 1 (2) implements Equation 1 excluding 
(including) the control of industry and regional effects. Regression 3 implements Equation 1 
using bootstrapped median regression to further control against the influence of outliers. 
Across all regressions in both panels, notice that the coefficient pertaining to STATE is 
significantly negative. This indicates that the firms with higher state to total shares indeed 
have lower share price informativeness during the time period before the Split Share Structure 
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Reform, which in our case is 2001 to 2005. This finding confirms our prediction in hypothesis 
H1 and is broadly similar to the finding of Gul et al. (2010), which is based on an earlier 
period of 1996 to 2003. It suggests that higher state ownership firms indeed have poorer 
information environment prior to the reforms.  
< Insert Table 2 here > 
To the extent that the use of restricted shares to maintain state ownership contributes 
toward this low corporate transparency, we expect to observe an improvement of information 
environment following the Split Share Structure Reform. To draw such an inference, we need 
to observe significantly greater improvement among the firms that are more sensitive to the 
reform relative to the firms that are not. Indeed, notice in both Panels A and B that the 
coefficients of the interaction term between STATE and SSSR are significantly positive. This 
indicates incrementally higher increase in share price informativeness among firms that have 
higher state ownership. This finding confirms our prediction in hypothesis H2 and suggests 
that abolishing restricted shares indeed leads to greater improvement of corporate transparency 
in Chinese listed firms. As robustness check, we also replicated our tests by replacing the sate 
ownership variable (STATE) with a dummy variable indicating 1 for firms with state 
ownership higher than 30% and 0 otherwise, and obtained similar results in support of our 
hypotheses. 
Our results in Table 2 is robust to alternative measures of share price informativeness 
as well as controls of firm size, growth opportunity, leverage, profitability, trading volume, 
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corporate governance variables, as well as industry and regional effects. Consistent with 
untabulated results of the bivariate correlation analyses, Table 2 shows that share price 
informativeness measures (dependent variables) have significantly negative relationship with 
state ownership (STATE) and firm size (lnSIZE) and have significantly positive relationship 
with growth opportunities (MB) and leverage (LEV). In addition, Table 2 also shows that share 
price informativeness measures have significantly positive relationship with profitability 
(IROA) and board independence (BINDP). The former is consistent with more profitable firms 
having less need to manipulate earnings and the latter is consistent with independent directors 
being more effective in promoting corporate transparency.  
Table 3 uses the proportion of restricted shares to total shares to identify firms more 
sensitive to the reform for our tests. This provides a further robustness test to our findings of 
Table 2 based on the proportion of state ownership. Notice throughout Table 3 that the 
coefficient pertaining to RESTRICT is significantly negative, which indicate that firms with 
more restricted shares indeed have weaker information environment prior to the reform and 
again confirms our H1 hypothesis. The coefficients of interaction term between RESTRICT and 
SSSR are all significantly positive, which indicates that firms more sensitive to the impact of 
the reform are indeed associated with more share price informativeness following the reform. 
Since the Split Share Structure Reform is directly relevant to restricted shares, our finding in 
Table 3 provides further evidence in favor of our prediction in hypothesis H2. Firms with 
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higher proportion of restricted shares are likely to experience greater reduction in the conflict 
of interest between shareholder of restricted and tradable shares. Our findings in Table 3 are 
also robust to the control of firm characteristics, corporate governance, both industry and 
regional effects (Regression 2), and bootstrapped median regressions (Regression 3). 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
4.2 Robustness checks 
4.2.1 Alternative model specification and daily returns 
Tables 4 and 5 replicate our analyses in both Tables 2 and 3 using share price 
informativeness measures estimated from alternative model specifications (see Section 3.1) 
using daily returns. In Regression 1 the share price informativeness measure accounts for daily 
returns of market portfolio based on all A shares in both Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges 
(Equation 2). In Regressions 2, the measure also accounts for daily returns of US market 
(Equation 3). In Regression 3, the measure accounts for industry-wide return variations 
(Equation 5) following Gul et al. (2010). In Regression 4, we estimate share price 
informatinveness using Equations 6a, 6b, and 6c for Chinese listed firms that issues pure A 
shares, B shares, and H shares respectively. In both Tables 4 and 5, the coefficients for STATE 
and RESTRICT are consistently negatively significant, which supports our hypothesis H1. 
Throughout Table 4 (5) the coefficient pertaining to the interactive term between STATE 
(RESTRICT) and SSSR are both significantly positive, which support our H2. This suggests 
that our findings in support of both hypotheses are not sensitive to alternative model 
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specifications or data frequencies used to estimate share price informativeness. 
< Insert Tables 4 and 5 here > 
4.2.2 Excluding reform selection year 
Table 6 replicates the tests in both Tables 2 and 3 by excluding firm observations for 
the first year they were selected to implement the reform (Regressions 2 and 4 are based on 
bootstrapped median regression). Although the Chinese government finalized its intention at 
the end of 2005 to enact the Split Share Structure Reform throughout the entire stock market, 
individual firms were selected in batches to carry out the implementation (see Section 2.3 for 
details of reform process). The reason we exclude this first year is because the news regarding 
the proposed compensation scheme and its process of negotiation and voting may provide 
firm-specific information that could be captured by our share price informativeness measure. 
Since this has nothing to do with the voluntary improvement of corporate transparency, if our 
findings in Tables 2 and 3 were  driven by changes in share price informativeness in this first 
year of implementation, then we would wrongly infer that the reform improved information 
environment from our results. Across Table 6, we observe that firms with higher state or 
restricted to total shares ratio are associated with significantly lower share price 
informativeness before the reform and greater increase in share price informativeness after the 
reform, which confirms the predictions in both of our hypotheses. This ensures that our 
findings of greater share price informativeness are not driven by firm-specific news associated 
with the compensation negotiation process that has nothing to do with firm voluntary 
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disclosure. 
< Insert Table 6 here > 
4.2.3 Firm-specific reform effect 
Table 7 replicates the analyses in both Tables 2 and 3 by defining the reform period 
based on firm-specific starting year when they are actually chosen to begin the process 
(Regressions 2 and 4 are based on bootstrapped median regression). As we argue earlier, the 
alignment of interest between state or private shareholders to ensure managers maximize the 
market value of their firm should already begin 2006 onward when the Chinese government 
made clear its decision that the restricted shares will be abolished. The State Council 
announced “The key tasks of the State Council in 2006” on 19 March 2006 to set an explicit 
timeline and requires the reform to be generally completed by the end of 2006. Knowing that 
all trading restrictions of their shares will be lifted in due course, state shareholders can begin 
to step up their demand for managers to focus more on share return performance during the 
expectation period even before the actual implementation process commence since it takes 
time to adjust corporate strategy and make business decision (see Section 2.4 for detailed 
discussion). However, to ensure our finding that improved corporate transparency persist after 
each firm have been chosen to enact the reform process, we replace the market-level variable 
SSSR with firm-level variable REFORM. We assign this variable to 1 for the year in which the 
chosen firm in the reform has delivered the compensation following  and the years afterwards, 
and 0 otherwise. Across Table 7, we draw similar inferences to Tables 2 and 3 that firms more 
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sensitive to the impact of the reform are associated with significantly greater improvement in 
corporate transparency measured by share price informativeness. This suggests that the 
increase of information disclosure is not limited to the market-level or firm-level measure of 
the reform.   
< Insert Table 7 here > 
4.2.4 Excluding IFRS period 
Table 8 replicates the tests in Tables 7 by excluding the time period in which 
mandatory IFRS could affect share prices movement of Chinese listed firms. China enacted 
IFRS across all listed firms for fiscal year 2007. Since all Chinese firms have fiscal year 
ending in December, we assume that their annual reports will not be available to investors 
until March 2008 and only after that will changes in the accounting standards have the 
potential to influence the share price of Chinese listed firms. As indicated in Table 8, after 
excluding 2008 from our sample, we acquire results that are consistent with our findings in 
Tables 2 and 3. This suggests that findings in support of our hypothesis H2 are not due to the 
introduction of IFRS. 
< Insert Table 8 here > 
5. Conclusion 
We show that the Split Share Structure Reform increased share price informativeness 
of Chinese listed firms, especially those with higher state ownership and restricted shares. 
Improved corporate transparency is expected to reduce the cost of equity capital of these firms, 
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which also reduce their dependence on the government’s financial support. Future researches 
could also look into the effect of this reform on other restricted shareholders that are not 
affiliated to the state.
11
 For instance, how influential are these shareholders in the corporate 
governance of Chinese listed firms? What is the impact of this reform on their shareholdings? 
While these are research questions beyond the scope of this study, they are worthwhile to 
explore given the uniqueness of the institutional setting China.  
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Notes: 
1. In 2007, China imposed mandatory adoption of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) on all listed firms. As robustness check, we exclude the time period in which 
IFRS is expected to influence share price movement and acquired similar results in support to 
our main inference of the Split Share Structure Reform effect (see Section 4.2.4). 
2. The literature also suggests that better corporate information environment in turn improves 
the ability of outside investors to discipline insiders through share price and/or efficient 
contracting (e.g. Bushman and Smith, 2001) 
3. Private investors can also hold legal person shares. 
4. For instance, this policy has been laid out in the Ninth Five-Year Plan for National 
Economic and Social Development and the Outline for the Long-Range Objective Through the 
Year 2010. 
5. We list a few recent financial news articles here by translating their Chinese language 
headlines into English language and provide their web link for reference: 
 “29 firms this year experienced local government stock ownership reduction” 
http://finance.ifeng.com/stock/zqyw/20110827/4474686.shtml  
 “Selling shares – July wave of government stock ownership reduction wave” 
http://stock.hexun.com/2011-07-29/131890710.html 
 “Local government July stock ownership reduction in 25 listed firms to cash in 
3.3billion RMB” 
http://www.beelink.com/20110808/2808514.shtml 
6. Some recent studies include Morck, Yeong, Yu. (2000), Durnev, Morck, Yeung, & Zarowin 
(2003), Jin and Myers (2006), Fernandes and Ferreria (2008), and Gul et al. (2010) 
7. In calculating state to total share ratio we exclude state ownership held via legal person 
shares. 
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8. Gul et al (2010) also tests the effect of foreign shareholding and ownership concentration to 
the share price informativeness of Chinese listed firms. In untabulated tests we include these 
variables as additional control variables and all our findings remains robust. However, due to 
data availability these variables reduce our sample size so we choose not to include them in 
our main analyses. 
9. These include: 1. Shanghai and Shenzen; 2. More developed areas including open cities and 
provinces along the coast; 3. Inland provinces; 4. Least developed area in the north-western 
regions. 
10. Majority of shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges are traded in RMB and 
known as A shares. However, some Chinese listed firms also issue shares traded in US$ (in 
Shanghai Stock Exchange) and HK$ (in Shenzhen Stock Exchange) and this are known as B 
shares. Shares of Chinese firms traded in Hong Kong stock exchange and in HK$ are known 
as H shares.    
11. We thank the referee for suggesting this. 
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TABLE 1: Sample and summary statistic 
 
Panel A Annual number of firm-year observations 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
1,044 1,123 1,207 1,320 1,324 1,316 1,272 1,265 9,871 
         Panel B Summary statistics 
Variables 
 
Observations 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
deviation 
25
th
  
percentile 
50
th
  
percentile 
75
th
  
percentile 
Ψ1  9871 2.3677 1.5891 1.3300 1.9523 2.9037 
Ψ2  9871 1.9627 1.1493 1.1590 1.7048 2.5126 
STATE 9871 0.3181 0.2508 0.0142 0.3406 0.5360 
RESTRICT 9871 0.5352 0.1627 0.4377 0.5662 0.6546 
lnSIZE 9871 20.5602 1.0001 19.8700 20.4545 21.1187 
MB  9871 3.6669 4.0470 1.7092 2.5697 4.2672 
LEV 9871 0.5183 0.2641 0.3626 0.5047 0.6326 
IROA 9871 -0.0014 0.0196 -0.0048 0.0001 0.0068 
VOL 9871 4.5726 3.5506 1.9639 3.3750 6.0372 
CEO ownership 9871 0.0019  0.0161  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CEO duality 9871 0.0100  0.0996  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Board independence 9871 0.4758  0.2172  0.4000  0.5000  0.5714  
Board size 9871 6.7337  2.0049  6  6  8 
       
The table presents our sample and summary statistics. Our sample covers Chinese listed firms over 2001-2008. We 
exclude the firms listed after the launch of the Split Share Structure Reform (2006 onwards) because trading constraints 
are no longer imposed on them, and they are not affected by the reform anyway. Ψ1 (Ψ2) is share price informativeness 
measure derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on Chinese 
(both Chinese and US) stock market weekly excess returns. STATE (RESTRICT) is with the ratio of state shares 
(restricted shares) relative to the total shares of the listed firm. lnSIZE is natural log of market capitalization. MB is 
market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as 
operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. CEO ownership is number of 
shares held by CEO divided by total number of shares. CEO duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as chairperson 
of the board. Board independence is the number of independent directors relative to the total number of directors in the 
board. Board size is the number of directors on the board. 
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TABLE 2: Regression analyses using state to total shares ratio 
   Panel A: Ψ1    Panel B: Ψ2  
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Intercept 13.3195 (34.79) 
*** 
13.2048 (25.18) 
***
 11.0631 (18.34) 
***
 9.5259 (34.55) 
***
 9.4730 (28.11) 
***
 8.5891 (14.13) 
***
 
STATE -0.2375 (-3.07) 
*** 
-0.1821 (-2.36) 
**
 -0.1670 (-2.91) 
***
 -0.1640 (-2.86) 
***
 -0.1224 (-2.15) 
**
 -0.1457 (-2.38) 
**
 
SSSR 0.9865 (16.66) 
*** 
0.985 (16.47) 
***
 0.6070 (12.06) 
***
 0.4779 (11.43) 
***
 0.4742 (11.26) 
***
 0.2484 (3.73) 
***
 
STATE×SSSR 0.5742 (4.60) 
*** 
0.5824 (4.67) 
***
 0.4737 (5.58) 
***
 0.5163 (5.79) 
***
 0.5264 (5.92) 
***
 0.5590 (5.45) 
***
 
lnSIZE -0.5496 (-28.81) 
*** 
-0.5453 (-28.32) 
***
 -0.4367 (-28.98) 
***
 -0.3769 (-27.19) 
***
 -0.3719 (-26.56) 
***
 -0.3328 (-16.52) 
***
 
MB  0.0098 (2.33) 
** 
0.0073 (1.70) 
*
 0.0049 (1.14)  0.0046 (1.49)  0.0026 (0.85)  0.0057 (1.32)  
LEV 0.4584 (6.77) 
*** 
0.4710 (6.95) 
***
 0.5331 (7.47) 
***
 0.2744 (5.71) 
***
 0.2830 (5.83) 
***
 0.3426 (5.02) 
***
 
IROA 3.3035 (3.23) 
*** 
3.2049 (3.13) 
***
 3.3635 (4.37) 
***
 2.6409 (3.62) 
***
 2.5475 (3.47) 
***
 2.9834 (4.14) 
***
 
VOL -0.0686 (-13.50) 
*** 
-0.0677 (-13.27) 
***
 -0.0435 (-10.23) 
***
 -0.0407 (-10.91) 
***
 -0.0399 (-10.69) 
***
 -0.0291 (-9.68) 
***
 
CHOLD 0.0225 (0.64) 
 
0.0148 (0.43)  0.0169 (0.58)  0.0290 (1.10)  0.0250 (0.97)  0.0062 (0.28) 
***
 
CDUAL -0.1707 (-1.26) 
 
-0.1926 (-1.40)  -0.1542 (-0.97)  -0.0848 (-0.79)  -0.1031 (-0.96)  -0.1297 (-1.05)  
BINDP 0.1529 (3.53) 
*** 
0.1607 (3.74) 
***
 0.1166 (4.00) 
***
 0.1385 (4.45) 
***
 0.1453 (4.71) 
***
 0.1265 (3.91) 
***
 
BSIZE -0.0047 (-0.14) 
 
0.0021 (0.06)  0.0271 (0.94)  0.0099 (0.39)  0.0146 (0.58)  0.0113 (0.43)  
Industry effect No    Yes    Yes    No    Yes    Yes    
Region effect No     Yes    Yes    No    Yes    Yes    
BSQREG No    No    Yes    No    No    Yes    
Adjusted R
2
 0.138    0.1414       0.1086   0.1122      
Pseudo R
2
       0.0737          0.0594    
Observations 9871    9871    9871    9871    9871    9871    
                   
The table presents regression analyses. Our sample covers Chinese listed firms over 2001-2008. We exclude the firms listed after the launch of the Split Share Structure Reform 
(2006 onwards) because trading constraints are no longer imposed on them, and they are not affected by the reform anyway. The dependent variable in Panel A (B) is share price 
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informativeness measure Ψ1 (Ψ2) derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on Chinese (both Chinese and US) stock market 
weekly excess returns. STATE is the ratio of state shares relative to the total shares of the listed firm. SSSR is 1 for years from 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. lnSIZE is natural log of 
market capitalization. MB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total 
asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. CHOLD is 1 for firms with CEO shareholding in yearly cross-sectional top or bottom 25
 
percentile and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 
for firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above yearly cross-sectional median and 0 
otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Industry effect and Region effect indicate whether these effects are controlled 
in the analyses. The industry classification is based on the first two digits of GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) codes. The region classification is based on Firth et al. 
(2006), which groups firms into four regions based on the levels of economic development: 1. Shanghai and Shenzhen; 2. The more developed regions including open cities and 
provinces along the coast; 3. The inland provinces; 4. The least developed area in the north-western part of the country. For brevity we do not report the coefficient of the 10 industry 
dummy variables and 3 regional dummy variables. Regression 1 (2) exclude (include) the control of industry and regional effects and reports adjusted R2. Regression 3 uses 
bootstrapped median regression (BSQREG) and reports pseudo R
2
. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The t-statistics for Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for firm clustering. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicates significance to 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
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TABLE 3: Regression analyses using restricted to total shares ratio 
   Panel A: Ψ1    Panel B: Ψ2  
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Intercept 13.0626 (32.16) *** 12.8234 (23.49) *** 10.8757 (23.86) *** 9.2675 (32.18) *** 9.0752 (26.20) *** 8.2169 (16.04) *** 
RESTRICT -0.4566 (-2.83) *** -0.3862 (-2.42) ** -0.3525 (-2.89) *** -0.3456 (-2.80) *** -0.2887 (-2.38) ** -0.2941 (-1.76) ** 
SSSR 0.2832 (2.47) ** 0.2927 (2.57) *** 0.1345 (1.11)  -0.1356 (-1.58)  -0.1300 (-1.52)  -0.2246 (-1.96) * 
RESTRICT×SSSR 1.8017 (8.68) *** 1.7920 (8.66) *** 1.3569 (7.72) *** 1.5846 (10.34) *** 1.5775 (10.34) *** 1.3767 (8.58) *** 
lnSIZE -0.5267 (-28.03) *** -0.5178 (-27.13) *** -0.4151 (-23.28) *** -0.3561 (-26.15) *** -0.3474 (-25.02) *** -0.3121 (-17.25) *** 
MB  0.0089 (2.07) ** 0.0058 (1.32)  0.0016 (0.71)  0.0034 (1.07)  0.0009 (0.30)  0.0029 (0.77)  
LEV 0.4165 (6.00) *** 0.4286 (6.18) *** 0.4812 (5.30) *** 0.2420 (4.92) *** 0.2509 (5.05) *** 0.3325 (6.02) *** 
IROA 2.4957 (2.44) ** 2.3686 (2.32) ** 2.7715 (3.03) *** 1.8920 (2.59) *** 1.7769 (2.42) ** 2.1856 (2.98) *** 
VOL -0.0673 (-13.17) *** -0.0664 (-12.95) *** -0.0464 (-12.22) *** -0.0393 (-10.47) *** -0.0386 (-10.27) *** -0.0308 (-9.18) *** 
CHOLD 0.0402 (1.13)  0.0304 (0.87)  0.0127 (0.33)  0.0443 (1.66) * 0.0387 (1.48)  0.0342 (1.26)  
CDUAL -0.1860 (-1.37)  -0.2099 (-1.53)  -0.1088 (-0.74)  -0.0980 (-0.92)  -0.1177 (-1.10)  -0.1723 (-1.37)  
BINDP 0.1420 (3.29) *** 0.1516 (3.53) *** 0.0842 (1.64)  0.1294 (4.17) *** 0.1374 (4.46) *** 0.1194 (4.17) *** 
BSIZE -0.0084 (-0.25)  3.57E-5 (0.00) 
 
0.0125 (0.48)  0.0080 (0.31)  0.0139 (0.55)  0.0151 (0.64)  
Industry effect No    Yes    Yes    No    Yes    Yes    
Region effect No     Yes    Yes    No    Yes    Yes    
BSQREG No    No    Yes    No    No    Yes    
Adjusted R
2
 0.1447    0.1485      0.1191   0.1232      
Pseudo R
2
       0.077          0.0654   
Observations 9871    9871    9871    9871    9871    9871    
                   
The table presents regression analyses. Our sample covers Chinese listed firms over 2001-2008. We exclude the firms listed after the launch of the Split Share Structure Reform (2006 
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onwards) because trading constraints are no longer imposed on them, and they are not affected by the reform anyway. The dependent variable in Panel A (B) is share price informativeness 
measure Ψ1 (Ψ2)  derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on Chinese (both Chinese and US) stock market weekly excess returns. 
RESTRICT is the ratio of restricted shares relative to the total number of shares of the listed firm. SSSR is 1 for years from 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. lnSIZE is natural log of market 
capitalization. MB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is 
trading volume measured as turnover. CHOLD is 1 for firms with CEO shareholding in yearly cross-sectional top or bottom 25
 
percentile and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms with CEO 
also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms 
with board size above yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Industry effect and Region effect indicate whether these effects are controlled in the analyses. The industry 
classification is based on the first two digits of GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) codes. The region classification is based on Firth et al. (2006), which groups firms into four 
regions based on the levels of economic development: 1. Shanghai and Shenzhen; 2. The more developed regions including open cities and provinces along the coast; 3. The inland 
provinces; 4. The least developed area in the north-western part of the country. For brevity we do not report the coefficient of the 10 industry dummy variables and 3 regional dummy 
variables. Regression 1 (2) exclude (include) the control of industry and regional effects and reports adjusted R
2
. Regression 3 uses bootstrapped median regression (BSQREG) and reports 
pseudo R
2
. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The t-statistics for Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for firm clustering. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicates significance to 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively.  
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TABLE 4: Robustness tests using state to total shares ratio and share price informativeness 
estimated from daily stock returns and alternative model specifications 
   Ψ1 Ψ2 Ψ3 Ψ4 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Intercept 3.5821 (17.15) 
***
 3.3367 (16.50) 
***
 3.9872 (21.78) 
***
 3.3473 (16.91) 
***
 
STATE -0.2148 (-5.38) 
***
 -0.2126 (-5.45) 
***
 -0.2631 (-7.10) 
***
 -0.2127 (-5.46) 
***
 
SSSR 0.2063 (6.47) 
***
 0.1707 (5.52) 
***
 -0.0246 (-0.86) 
 
0.1635 (5.37) 
***
 
STATE×SSSR 0.3080 (4.44) 
***
 0.3035 (4.55) 
***
 0.2971 (4.74) 
***
 0.3029 (4.58) 
***
 
lnSIZE -0.1848 (-19.51) 
***
 -0.1739 (-18.97) 
***
 -0.2023 (-24.10) 
***
 -0.1740 (-19.33) 
***
 
MB  0.0441 (17.32) 
***
 0.0438 (18.09) 
***
 0.0396 (18.13) 
***
 0.0418 (17.84) 
***
 
LEV 0.9351 (21.81) 
***
 0.9027 (22.71) 
***
 0.7506 (21.83) 
***
 0.8815 (22.66) 
***
 
IROA 4.2091 (7.36) 
***
 3.9743 (7.30) 
***
 2.9673 (6.05) 
***
 3.9129 (7.31) 
***
 
VOL 0.0316 (11.35) 
***
 0.0359 (13.37) 
***
 0.0346 (13.86) 
***
 0.0351 (13.23) 
***
 
CHOLD -0.0279 (-1.58) 
 
-0.0249 (-1.44) 
 
-0.0101 (-0.60) 
 
-0.0218 (-1.26) 
 CDUAL 0.1235 (1.52) 
 
0.1124 (1.43) 
 
0.1198 (1.63) 
 
0.1015 (1.33) 
 BINDP -0.104 (-4.05) 
***
 -0.0955 (-3.84) 
***
 -0.1233 (-5.26) 
***
 -0.1075 (-4.33) 
***
 
BSIZE -0.001 (-0.06) 
 
-0.0014 (-0.08) 
 
-0.0083 (-0.51) 
 
-0.0002 (-0.01) 
 Industry effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  Region effect Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  Adjusted R
2
 0.231 
  
0.2325 
  
0.2051 
  
0.2266 
  Observations 9863 
  
9863 
  
9863 
  
9863 
                            
The table presents regression analyses. Our sample covers Chinese listed firms over 2001-2008. We exclude the 
firms listed after the launch of the Split Share Structure Reform (2006 onwards) because trading constraints are 
no longer imposed on them, and they are not affected by the reform anyway. The dependent variables in 
Regression 1 to 4 are share price informativeness measures Ψ1 to Ψ4 respectively and estimated using daily stock 
returns. Ψ1 and Ψ2 are respectively based on the daily returns estimated by Equation (2) and (3). Ψ3 accounts for 
industry-wide return variations (Equation 5) following Gul et al., (2010). Ψ4 uses Equations 6a, 6b, and 6c for 
Chinese listed firms that issues pure A shares, B shares, and H shares respectively. STATE is the ratio of state 
shares relative to the total shares of the listed firm. SSSR is 1 for years from 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. 
lnSIZE is natural log of market capitalization. MB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA 
is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading 
volume measured as turnover. CHOLD is 1 for firms with CEO shareholding in yearly cross-sectional top or 
bottom 25
 
percentile and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 
otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above yearly cross-sectional median 
and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. 
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Industry effect and Region effect indicate whether these effects are controlled in the analyses. The industry 
classification is based on the first two digits of GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) codes. The region 
classification is based on Firth et al. (2006), which groups firms into four regions based on the levels of 
economic development: 1. Shanghai and Shenzhen; 2. The more developed regions including open cities and 
provinces along the coast; 3. The inland provinces; 4. The least developed area in the north-western part of the 
country. Regression 1 (2) exclude (include) the control of industry and regional effects and reports adjusted R
2
. 
For brevity we do not report the coefficient of the 10 industry dummy variables and 3 regional dummy variables. 
Regression 3 uses bootstrapped median regression (BSQREG) and reports pseudo R
2
. All t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. The t-statistics for Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for firm clustering. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicates 
significance to 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
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TABLE 5: Robustness tests using restricted to total shares ratio and share price 
informativeness estimated from daily stock returns and alternative model specifications 
  Ψ1 Ψ2 Ψ3 Ψ4 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Intercept 3.4031 (14.89) *** 3.1641 (14.26) *** 4.0270 (19.83) *** 3.1610 (14.56) *** 
RESTRICT -0.4249 (-5.29) *** -0.4125 (-5.25) *** -0.5513 (-7.39) *** -0.4007 (-5.09) *** 
SSSR -0.4771 (-8.13) *** -0.4895 (-8.52) *** -0.6903 (-12.62) *** -0.4916 (-8.57) *** 
RESTRICT×SSSR 1.6094 (15.3) *** 1.5584 (15.27) *** 1.5345 (15.84) *** 1.5505 (15.27) *** 
lnSIZE -0.1679 (-17.36) *** -0.1576 (-16.81) *** -0.1933 (-22.28) *** -0.1574 (-17.12) *** 
MB  0.0433 (17.06) *** 0.0430 (17.86) *** 0.0395 (18.14) *** 0.0410 (17.58) *** 
LEV 0.9102 (21.46) *** 0.8788 (22.31) *** 0.7284 (21.35) *** 0.8579 (22.28) *** 
IROA 3.4741 (6.11) *** 3.2620 (6.04) *** 2.3978 (4.90) *** 3.1925 (6.01) *** 
VOL 0.0328 (11.97) *** 0.0370 (14.01) *** 0.0358 (14.48) *** 0.0362 (13.86) *** 
CHOLD -0.0100 (-0.57) 
 
-0.0075 (-0.44) 
 
0.0042 (0.25) 
 
-0.0040 (-0.24) 
 
CDUAL 0.1178 (1.47) 
 
0.1069 (1.37) 
 
0.1128 (1.55) 
 
0.0963 (1.29) 
 
BINDP -0.1134 (-4.46) *** -0.1046 (-4.26) *** -0.1330 (-5.72) *** -0.1167 (-4.75) *** 
BSIZE -0.0073 (-0.42) 
 
-0.0076 (-0.44) 
 
-0.0148 (-0.91) 
 
-0.0065 (-0.38) 
 
Industry effect Yes   
 
Yes   
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  Region effect Yes   
 
Yes   
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
  Adjusted R
2
   0.2496 
  
0.2507 
  
0.2211 
  
0.2451 
  Observations 9863 
  
9863 
  
9863   9863   
The table presents regression analyses. Our sample covers Chinese listed firms over 2001-2008. We exclude the 
firms listed after the launch of the Split Share Structure Reform (2006 onwards) because trading constraints are no 
longer imposed on them, and they are not affected by the reform anyway. The dependent variables in Regression 1 
to 4 are share price informativeness measures Ψ1 to Ψ4 respectively and estimated using daily stock returns. Ψ1 and 
Ψ2 are respectively based on the daily returns estimated by Equation (2) and (3). Ψ3 accounts for industry-wide 
return variations (Equation 5) following Gul et al., (2010). Ψ4 uses Equations 6a, 6b, and 6c for Chinese listed 
firms that issues pure A shares, B shares, and H shares respectively. RESTRICT is the ratio of restricted shares 
relative to the total number of shares of the listed firm. SSSR is 1 for years from 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. 
lnSIZE is natural log of market capitalization. MB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA 
is industry median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading 
volume measured as turnover. CHOLD is 1 for firms with CEO shareholding in yearly cross-sectional top or 
bottom 25
 
percentile and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 
otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above yearly cross-sectional median and 
0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Industry 
effect and Region effect indicate whether these effects are controlled in the analyses. The industry classification is 
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based on the first two digits of GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) codes. The region classification is 
based on Firth et al. (2006), which groups firms into four regions based on the levels of economic development: 1. 
Shanghai and Shenzhen; 2. The more developed regions including open cities and provinces along the coast; 3. 
The inland provinces; 4. The least developed area in the north-western part of the country. For brevity we do not 
report the coefficient of the 10 industry dummy variables and 3 regional dummy variables. Regression 1 (2) 
exclude (include) the control of industry and regional effects and reports adjusted R
2
. Regression 3 uses 
bootstrapped median regression (BSQREG) and reports pseudo R
2
. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
t-statistics for Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for firm clustering. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicates significance to 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level respectively. 
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TABLE 6: Robustness tests with firm-specific initial year of reform excluded from sample 
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Intercept 7.6124 (24.60) 
***
 6.5325 (22.27) 
***
 7.6907 (23.38) 
***
 6.7165 (24.99) 
***
 
STATE -0.1541 (-2.72) 
***
 -0.1983 (-4.64) 
***
       
RESTRICT       -0.3424 (-2.82) 
***
 -0.3445 (-2.85) 
***
 
SSSR -0.0062 (-0.14)  -0.1175 (-3.01) 
***
 -0.4478 (-5.30) 
***
 -0.3583 (-3.99) 
***
 
STATE×SSSR 0.2894 (2.93) 
***
 0.2134 (2.59) 
***
       
RESTRICT×SSSR       1.1343 (7.34) 
***
 0.6410 (4.42) 
***
 
lnSIZE -0.2913 (-19.86) 
***
 -0.2424 (-17.29) 
***
 -0.2879 (-19.90) 
***
 -0.2455 (-22.59) 
***
 
MB  0.0123 (3.82) 
***
 0.0134 (5.20) 
***
 0.0121 (3.73) 
***
 0.0129 (3.92) 
***
 
LEV 0.4564 (9.17) 
***
 0.4198 (7.29) 
***
 0.4310 (8.62) 
***
 0.4341 (9.20) 
***
 
IROA 2.6745 (3.59) 
***
 2.1978 (2.84) 
***
 2.3270 (3.12) 
***
 2.4508 (3.85) 
***
 
VOL -0.0136 (-3.69) 
***
 -0.0088 (-2.08) 
**
 -0.0137 (-3.70) 
***
 -0.0093 (-2.24) 
**
 
CHOLD 0.0116 (0.42)  0.0009 (0.04)  0.0192 (0.70)  0.0027 (0.10)  
CDUAL -0.1297 (-1.21)  -0.1672 (-1.75) 
*
 -0.1423 (-1.34)  -0.1611 (-2.15) 
**
 
BINDP 0.1749 (5.53) 
***
 0.1408 (3.03) 
***
 0.1682 (5.33) 
***
 0.1354 (3.23) 
***
 
BSIZE 0.0044 (0.17)  0.0005 (0.02)  0.0023 (0.09)  -0.0102 (-0.52)  
Industry effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Region effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
BSQREG No   Yes   No   Yes   
Adjusted R
2
 0.0999      0.1051      
Pseudo R
2
    0.0629      0.0635   
Observations 8634   8634    8634   8634    
             
The table presents regression analyses. Our sample covers Chinese listed firms over 2001-2008. We exclude the firms listed after the 
launch of the Split Share Structure Reform (2006 onwards) because trading constraints are no longer imposed on them, and they are 
not affected by the reform anyway. Observations in firm-specific first year of reform are also excluded from sample. The dependent 
variable is share price informativeness measure Ψ2 derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly 
excess returns on Chinese domestic and U.S. stock market weekly excess returns. STATE (RESTRICT) is with the ratio of state shares 
(restricted shares) relative to the total shares of the listed firm. SSSR is 1 for years from 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. lnSIZE is 
natural log of market capitalization. MB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median adjusted 
return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. CHOLD is 1 for 
firms with CEO shareholding in yearly cross-sectional top or bottom 25
 
percentile and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms with CEO 
also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above yearly 
cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. 
Industry effect and Region effect indicate whether these effects are controlled in the analyses. The industry classification is based on 
the first two digits of GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) codes. The region classification is based on Firth et al. (2006), 
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which groups firms into four regions based on the levels of economic development: 1. Shanghai and Shenzhen; 2. The more 
developed regions including open cities and provinces along the coast; 3. The inland provinces; 4. The least developed area in the 
north-western part of the country. For brevity we do not report the coefficient of the 10 industry dummy variables and 3 regional 
dummy variables. Regression 1 (2) exclude (include) the control of industry and regional effects and reports adjusted R
2
. Regression 3 
uses bootstrapped median regression (BSQREG) and reports pseudo R
2
. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The t-statistics for 
Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for firm clustering. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicates significance to 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
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TABLE 7: Robustness tests using firm-specific reform period  
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Intercept 8.6679 (25.95) 
***
 7.7943 (22.74) 
***
 8.5916 (25.01) 
***
 7.7505 (22.18) 
***
 
STATE -0.1773 (-3.09) 
***
 -0.2042 (-3.80) 
***
       
RESTRICT       -0.4672 (-3.66) 
***
 -0.4675 (-2.65) 
***
 
REFORM 0.1950 (4.54) 
***
 -0.0060 (-0.14)  -0.4082 (-4.42) 
***
 -0.4334 (-3.52) 
***
 
STATE×REFORM 0.5452 (6.13) 
***
 0.5013 (4.13) 
***
       
RESTRICT×REFORM       1.5579 (9.60) 
***
 1.2284 (6.20) 
***
 
lnSIZE -0.3346 (-24.34) 
***
 -0.2943 (-25.73) 
***
 -0.3211 (-23.86) 
***
 -0.2857 (-22.68) 
***
 
MB  0.0036 (1.21)  0.0077 (2.20) 
**
 0.0033 (1.08)  0.0069 (1.78) 
*
 
LEV 0.3773 (7.84) 
***
 0.3753 (11.65) 
***
 0.3757 (7.85) 
***
 0.3932 (6.92) 
***
 
IROA 2.6056 (3.59) 
***
 2.6056 (3.97) 
***
 2.0107 (2.75) 
***
 2.1641 (2.73) 
***
 
VOL -0.0183 (-4.91) 
***
 -0.0101 (-3.18) 
***
 -0.0176 (-4.70) 
***
 -0.0129 (-3.88) 
***
 
CHOLD 0.0117 (0.45)  0.0004 (0.01)  0.0170 (0.66)  0.0162 (0.46)  
CDUAL -0.0988 (-0.93)  -0.0910 (-0.92)  -0.1001 (-0.95)  -0.2108 (-2.05) 
**
 
BINDP 0.1330 (4.34) 
***
 0.1186 (4.36) 
***
 0.1267 (4.17) 
***
 0.1031 (3.16) 
***
 
BSIZE 0.0058 (0.24)  0.0099 (0.37)  0.0056 (0.23)  0.0108 (0.46)  
Industry effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Region effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
BSQREG No   Yes   No   Yes   
Adjusted R
2
 0.089      0.0968      
Pseudo R
2
    0.0525      0.0554   
Observations 9871   9871   9871   9871   
             
The table presents regression analyses. Our sample covers all Chinese listed firms over 2001-2008. We exclude the firms listed after the 
launch of the Split Share Structure Reform (2006 onwards) because trading constraints are no longer imposed on them, and they are not 
affected by the reform anyway. The dependent variable is share price informativeness measure Ψ2 derived from residual variances of 
time-series regressions of firm-specific weekly excess returns on Chinese domestic and U.S. stock market weekly excess returns. 
STATE (RESTRICT) is with the ratio of state shares (restricted shares) relative to the total shares of the listed firm. REFORM is 1 for the 
year in which the slected firm has delivered the compensation following the negotiation and voting process and all years onward, and 0 
otherwise. lnSIZE is natural log of market capitalization. MB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry 
median adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. 
CHOLD is 1 for firms with CEO shareholding in yearly cross-sectional top or bottom 25
 
percentile and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for 
firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above 
yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above yearly cross-sectional median and 0 
otherwise. Industry effect and Region effect indicate whether these effects are controlled in the analyses. The industry classification is 
based on the first two digits of GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) codes. The region classification is based on Firth et al. 
(2006), which groups firms into four regions based on the levels of economic development: 1. Shanghai and Shenzhen; 2. The more 
developed regions including open cities and provinces along the coast; 3. The inland provinces; 4. The least developed area in the 
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north-western part of the country. For brevity we do not report the coefficient of the 10 industry dummy variables and 3 regional 
dummy variables. Regression 1 (2) exclude (include) the control of industry and regional effects and reports adjusted R
2
. Regression 3 
uses bootstrapped median regression (BSQREG) and reports pseudo R
2
. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The t-statistics for 
Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for firm clustering. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicates significance to 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
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TABLE 8: Robustness tests excluding 2008 when IFRS may affect information environment  
  Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Intercept 13.8328 (23.87) 
*** 
12.6436 (23.29) 
*** 
14.0850 (21.98) 
*** 
12.9676 (19.54) 
*** 
STATE -0.1924 (-2.51) 
** 
-0.1455 (-2.68) 
*** 
  
 
  
 
RESTRICT   
 
  
 
-0.4796 (-2.75) 
*** 
-0.5029 (-3.45) 
*** 
REFORM 1.2788 (14.78) 
*** 
1.0280 (11.78) 
*** 
0.9567 (5.65) 
*** 
0.5672 (3.53) 
*** 
STATE×REFORM 0.5573 (3.32) 
*** 
0.4352 (3.59) 
*** 
  
 
  
 
RESTRICT×REFORM   
 
  
 
0.8841 (3.11) 
*** 
1.0444 (4.65) 
*** 
lnSIZE -0.5615 (-26.69) 
*** 
-0.5004 (-27.46) 
*** 
-0.5622 (-25.39) 
*** 
-0.4955 (-20.90) 
*** 
MB  -0.0028 (-0.48) 
 
-0.0127 (-2.77) 
*** 
-0.0018 (-0.31) 
 
-0.0104 (-1.81) 
* 
LEV 0.5615 (6.05) 
*** 
0.6847 (10.05) 
*** 
0.5585 (5.99) 
*** 
0.6679 (7.89) 
*** 
IROA 2.4878 (1.90) 
* 
5.4410 (7.07) 
*** 
2.4305 (1.84) 
* 
5.2839 (4.94) 
*** 
VOL -0.0828 (-11.89) 
*** 
-0.0657 (-9.42) 
*** 
-0.0806 (-11.28) 
*** 
-0.0592 (-8.47) 
*** 
CHOLD -0.0271 (-0.69) 
 
0.0006 (0.01) 
 
-0.0324 (-0.82) 
 
-0.0029 (-0.10) 
 
CDUAL -0.1548 (-1.06) 
 
-0.0763 (-0.34) 
 
-0.1697 (-1.15) 
 
-0.1359 (-0.75) 
 
BINDP 0.1186 (2.44) 
** 
0.1090 (2.72) 
*** 
0.1138 (2.35) 
** 
0.0928 (2.82) 
*** 
BSIZE 0.0033 (0.09) 
 
0.0306 (1.36) 
 
0.0060 (0.16) 
 
0.0391 (1.39) 
 
Industry effect Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Region effect Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
BSQREG No  
 
Yes  
 
No  
 
Yes  
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1495  
 
  
 
0.1491  
 
  
 
Pseudo R
2
   
 
0.0825  
 
  
 
0.0829  
 
Observations 8019   
  
8019   
  
8019   
  
8019   
 
             
The table presents regression analyses. Our sample covers Chinese listed firms over 2001-2007. We exclude the firms listed after the 
launch of the Split Share Structure Reform (2006 onwards) because trading constraints are no longer imposed on them, and they are 
not affected by the reform anyway. Observations in firm-specific first year of reform are excluded from sample. The dependent 
variable is share price informativeness measure Ψ2 derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of firm-specific 
weekly excess returns on Chinese domestic and U.S. stock market weekly excess returns. STATE (RESTRICT) is with the ratio of 
state shares (restricted shares) relative to the total shares of the listed firm.. SSSR is 1 for years from 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. 
lnSIZE is natural log of market capitalization. MB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total asset ratio. IROA is industry median 
adjusted return on asset measured as operating income divided by total asset. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. CHOLD 
is 1 for firms with CEO shareholding in yearly cross-sectional top or bottom 25
 
percentile and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for firms 
with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above 
yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above yearly cross-sectional median and 0 
otherwise. Industry effect and “Region effect” indicate whether these effects are controlled in the analyses. The industry 
classification is based on the first two digits of GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) codes. The region classification is 
based on Firth et al. (2006), which groups firms into four regions based on the levels of economic development: 1. Shanghai and 
Shenzhen; 2. The more developed regions including open cities and provinces along the coast; 3. The inland provinces; 4. The least 
48 
 
developed area in the north-western part of the country. For brevity we do not report the coefficient of the 10 industry dummy 
variables and 3 regional dummy variables. Regression 1 (2) exclude (include) the control of industry and regional effects and reports 
adjusted R
2
. Regression 3 uses bootstrapped median regression (BSQREG) and reports pseudo R
2
. All t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The t-statistics for Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for firm clustering. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicates significance to 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level respectively. 
